OFFSHORE NORGE

135 – Offshore Norge Recommended guidelines for Classification and categorization of well control incidents and well integrity incidents

Final

PREFACE

This guideline is supported by Offshore Norge Drilling & Well Forum and by Offshore Norge Operations Committee. Further it has been approved by Offshore Norge general director.

Responsible manager in Offshore Norge is Manager Drilling who can be contacted via +47 51 84 65 00 (switchboard).

The guideline has been prepared with a broad participation from competent parties in the Norwegian petroleum industry, and is owned by the Norwegian petroleum industry, as represented by Offshore Norge. Offshore Norge is responsible for administration of this guideline.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

Objective
The purpose of this document is to provide a guide for:

- Categorization and classification of well control incidents.
- Categorization and classification of well integrity incidents in the operational and production phases.
- Correct evaluation and alerting, notification and reporting to the authorities.
- Facilitation of learning and experience transfer from well incidents.

Note that any incident or leakage downstream the wellhead or XT valves is not covered by this guideline and not defined as a well integrity incident, even if the incident may lead to a temporarily leak from the well to the environment (e.g., leakage from flowline).

Target group
The following are considered target groups for this guideline:

- All parties involved in categorization and classification of well control incidents and well integrity incidents.
- All parties involved in alerting, notifying, reporting, and following up well control incidents and well integrity incidents towards the authorities.
- All parties involved in alerting, notifying, reporting, and following up well integrity incidents towards the authorities.

Flowchart handling and reporting a well control incident.

The flowchart in Appendix A (App A) should be used to ensure that all steps in the reporting and experience transfer process for a well control or well integrity incident is fulfilled.

1.2 Terminology

Definitions and abbreviations

Definitions

Blowout
An uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons, or other fluids, or materials from a well, occurring when the well is in communication with a subsurface reservoir under pressure or with an overburden formation having similar characteristics.

Categorization
The term “categorization” refers to the nature of a well incident, indicating whether it is a well control or well integrity incident.

Classification

The term “classification” refers to the severity of an incident, which is expressed on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 being the most severe and 4 being the least severe. Each level is also associated with a colour code: red for the highest severity, yellow for moderate, green for low, and grey for negligible severity.

Discharge
An unintentional release of an accountable volume of hydrocarbons, other fluids, or materials from a well. An unintentional discharge is characterized by a volumetric measurement unit.

Drilling and Completion operation
Drilling, completion, or work-over activity.

Leak
An unintentional release of hydrocarbons, other fluids, or materials from a well over a measurable period of time. Leak is characterized by a mass flow rate expressed in mass units per unit of time.

Production and Operational Phases
The Production and Operational Phases cover all activities related to the operation of production and injection wells, including shut-in and temporary abandonment. This includes monitoring, inspection, testing and maintenance to ensure safe and efficient well performance.

Well control incident
A well control incident is in drilling & completion and live well intervention defined as a failure of barrier(s) or failure to activate barrier(s), resulting in an unintentional[1] flow of formation fluid –

i) into the well
ii) into another formation or
iii) to the external environment.

[1]) A planned flow is not a well control incident (for instance DST, mini-DST etc.)

Well integrity incident
For wells in the production or operations phases, a well integrity incident is defined as a failure of barrier(s) or failure to activate barrier(s) or failure to monitor barrier(s), resulting in a blowout, leak or unintentional discharge to the environment, other formations, or adjacent systems.

Well Intervention operation
Well intervention operations are conducted using topside mounted pressure control equipment.

Abbreviations

BOP	Blow Out Preventer

CDRS	Common Data Reporting System (SODIR/Havtil database)
CT	Coiled Tubing
DMF	Drilling Managers Forum
DST	Drill Stem Test
DHSV	Down Hole Safety Valve
D&W	Drilling & Well
Havtil	Havindustritilsynet (Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority)
HC	Hydrocarbons
HMV	Hydraulic Master Valve
MMV	Manual Master Valve
MPD	Managed Pressure Drilling
NCS	Norwegian Continental Shelf
Offshore Norge	Offshore Norge is an employer and industry organization for companies with activities related with the NCS
RNNP	Risk level Norwegian Petroleum industry
SBP	Surface Back Pressure
SODIR	Sokkeldirektoratet (Norwegian Offshore Directorate)
TH	Tubing Hanger
TTAC	Tubing to annulus communication
WCI	Well Control Incident
WH	Wellhead
WL	Wireline
XT	Christmas Tree

2 GUIDELINE WELL CONTROL INCIDENTS

The matrix in **App B** shall be used to classify the seriousness of a well control incident.

The matrix defines the criticality of a loss of barrier(s). It does not include an evaluation of the potential consequences of a well control incident – this shall be assessed separately and according to the company's internal incident evaluation process. This process should be in accordance with § 29 in the Management Regulations.

In **App D** are listed examples of classifications of incidents according to App B.

There is one matrix for drilling and completion operations and one matrix for well intervention operations.

2.1 Description of the matrix

2.1.1 Drilling and completion colour codes

The matrix's left column is organized according to criticality into four colour coded categories:

- Red – Critical well control incidents
- Yellow – Serious well control incidents
- Green – Regular well control incidents
- Grey – Well control experiences for learning

Red incidents; graded 1 – 4:
Grade 1: Blowout.
Grade 2: High HC influx rate
Grade 3: High-rate Shallow gas flow
Grade 4: High-rate Shallow water flow.

Yellow incidents; graded 1 - 3:
Grade 1: Medium HC influx, volume > kick tolerance that can be handled with kill procedures.
Grade 2: Loss of fluid barrier requiring closure of BOP.
Grade 3: Medium rate shallow gas flow to seabed or diverted on installation.

Green incidents; graded 1 - 3:
Grade 1: Low HC or water influx, volume < kick tolerance that can be handled with well control procedures.
Grade 2: Low-rate shallow gas with no gas on the installation.
Grade 3: Low-rate shallow water flow.

Grey incidents; incidents or near-misses such as non-continuous HC migration, loss of primary or secondary barrier without an influx into the well, and other operations with degraded barrier situation.

2.1.2 Well intervention – colour codes

The matrix's left column is organized according to criticality into four colour coded categories:

- Red – Critical well control incidents
- Yellow – Serious well control incidents
- Green – Regular well control incidents
- Grey – Well control experiences for learning

Red incidents; graded 1 - 2
Grade 1: Blowout.
Grade 2: Loss of primary and secondary barriers

Yellow incidents; graded 1
Grade 1: Failure of primary well barrier. Activation of secondary well barrier element.

Green incidents; graded 1
Grade 1: Temporary reduction of well barrier element function. Activation of redundant well barrier elements (Note 1)

Note 1: Redundant well barrier elements are defined as pipe ram for CT / cable rams for wireline or similar.

Grey incidents cover well control experiences:

- with industry learning potential
- with potential of loss of barrier and leak to atmosphere

The following incidents are not required to be reported, i.e. not well control incidents:	**Examples**
Temporary leak in dynamic seal ie. no need to use emergency procedures	• Increase pressure on stuffing box/ stripper • Change primary stripper if dual arrangement is in use

2.1.3 Alert and notification to Authorities

The Drilling & Completion and Intervention columns are divided into 3 colours: tan, blue and grey.

Incidents on tan background require an Alert to Havtil.
Incidents on blue background require a Notification to Havtil.
Incidents on grey background should, depending on potential, be reported in accordance with Management Regulations § 29.

Form: Confirmation of alert/notification to Havtil

2.1.4 Guidance and examples

The column “Guidance” provides additional information and description of the classification level topics.

In addition each level is provided with “Examples” in Appendix D”, see **App D** to assist in the categorization of an incident.

3 ONE PAGE WELL CONTROL INCIDENT PRESENTATION

A standardized “One page well control incident presentation” template is available here: Offshore Norge guideline 135 - templates

The intention is to have a standard format for presenting well control incidents for learning and experience transfer within Offshore Norge’s Well Incident Task Force and Drilling & Wells Forum.

4 GUIDELINE WELL INTEGRITY INCIDENTS

The matrix presented in Appendix E (**App E**) is a guide for classifying severity of a well integrity incident.

The matrix in App E shall be used to classify the seriousness of a well integrity incident. The matrix defines the criticality of a loss of barrier(s). It does not include an evaluation of the potential consequences of a well integrity incident. This shall be assessed separately and according to the company's internal evaluation process.

4.1 Description of matrix

4.1.1 Colour codes for classification

The matrix describes the classifications of well integrity incidents and provides guidance on how events should be classified according to this matrix. Colour coding is used to visualize Severity level and grade for incidents.

- Red - Critical well integrity incidents
- Yellow - Serious well integrity incidents
- Green - Medium well integrity incidents
- Grey - Well integrity experiences for learning

The middle column (Grade) of the matrix details the grading within each severity level concerning the characteristics of barrier failures or actual releases. This to further enhance the assessment of well integrity incidents. Each level can include either one or two grades to differentiate severity:

- Level 1 - Red incidents; graded 1 – 2 (Tan background)
- Level 2 - Yellow incidents; graded 1 (Tan background)
- Level 3 - Green incidents; graded 1 – 2 (Blue background)
- Level 4 - Grey incidents cover Well integrity experiences for learning (Grey background)

The right-hand column (Guidance) of the matrix outlines different scenarios for each severity level to determine whether to alert or notify HAVTIL.

Form: Confirmation of alert/notification to Havtil

4.1.2. Notification and reporting of well integrity incidents
Regulations (Management Regulations §29) specify requirements and expectations with regards to notification and reporting of hazard and accident situations to the supervisory authorities. The matrix in Appendix E gives guidance regarding communication of these hazards and accident situations. Colour coding for the background in the matrix is used to visualize reporting form for the different incidents.

The guidance for communication with authorities (HAVTIL) is as follows. Incidents classified as:
- Level 1, all grades, (tan background) requires an “Alert”.
- Level 2, all grades, (tan background) requires an “Alert”.
- Level 3, all grades, (blue background) requires a “Notification”.
- Level 4, all grades, (grey background) will in general require an internal evaluation process by the responsible parties, according to the management regulations §20, to prevent recurrence. However, communication with the authorities is required if the internal evaluation process shows that the conditions outlined in Management Regulations §29 are satisfied concerning the potential courses and consequences of the well integrity incident, given slightly altered circumstances.

An incident may initially be reported internally as a Level 4 – Grey incident, and subsequently reclassified to a Level 3, 2, or 1 incident, depending on the specific circumstances surrounding the case.

For the notification and reporting of hazard and accident situations follow this link to the relevant form to be filled: HAVTIL notification

4.1.2 Principles for Classification of well integrity incidents

The classification of the different severity levels of barrier failures and releases in the reporting matrix is based on leak rates or discharge volumes used for topside risk assessment, as well as the status of the well barriers.

The fourth level is included to provide guidance to the responsible parties regarding the cut off for reporting less severe incidents for use in internal reporting systems. This level

is designed to ensure that incidents, while not severe enough to warrant notification or reporting to the authorities, are still documented and analyzed to capture learning and enhance safety practices within the organization.
To facilitate learning and experience transfer a One Pager should be created (see section 5).

4.1.3 Internal reporting

Each company should align their requirements for internal reporting, investigation and experience transfer with the well integrity incident classification in this guideline.

5 ONE PAGE WELL INTEGRITY INCIDENT PRESENTATION

A template for creating a “one page” presentation of well integrity incidents is available here: Offshore Norge guideline 135 - templates
The intention is to have a standard format for presenting well integrity incidents for experience transfer within Offshore Norge’s Well Integrity Network and Drilling & Wells Forum.

6 APPENDIX

App A Flowchart for process of reporting and experience transfer of well control incidents.



App B Categorisation and classification matrix for well control incidents

Matrix for categorization and classification of well control incidents Drilling and Completion operations

Degree of seriousness	Description	Guidance
Level 1- Red Critical well control incidents	**1. Blowout**	1. Blowout to environment or facility including underground blow out. Failure or malfunction of primary and secondary barriers.
	2. High HC influx volume/rate	2. Failure of primary well barrier. Successful activation of the secondary well barrier. Critical kill operations with high risk of blowout.
	3. High-rate shallow gas flow	3. Shallow gas incident with unsuccessful kill operation. Gas flowing to seabed or installation (diverter), until all gas is released.
	4. High-rate shallow water flow	4. Shallow water flow influencing stability of an installation (jack-up, fixed installation or template)
Level 2 – Yellow Serious well control incidents	**1. Medium HC influx volume/rate**	1. Influx volume above design criteria for kick margin, but possible to regain barrier with standard kill procedure.
	2. Total Fluid barrier lost	2. Loss situation without being able to maintain the hydrostatic pressure in the well.
	3. Medium rate shallow gas flow	3. Shallow gas incident with kill operations or gas handled on installation by diverter.
Level 3 – Green Regular well control incidents	**1. Low HC or water influx volume/rate**	1. Influx volume below design criteria for kick margin, and successfully regained barrier with standard kill procedure without degrading well integrity.
	2. Low-rate shallow gas flow	2. Shallow gas incident with kill operations. No gas handled on installation (riser-less operation)
	3. Low-rate shallow water flow	3. Shallow water flow incident.
Level 4 – Well control experiences for learning	**1. Non-continuous gas/water migration in well - with all barriers in place**	1. Release of a barrier element with contained volume of gas/water trapped below or behind casing.
	2. Loss of primary or secondary barrier without influx into the well	2. Incidents where a barrier is compromised but no influx has occurred.
	3. Low-rate shallow gas/water flow from riser-less pilot hole drilled with floating unit	3. Shallow gas/water flow when de-risking planned well location with small-size pilot hole. Handled according to plan, without escalation.
	4. Failed inflow test of mechanical barrier element	4. Minor influx during a failed inflow test. Fluid barrier re-established according to plan, without escalation.
	5. Influx suppressed with Surface Back Pressure MPD system	5. A single influx volume within defined limit in MPD well control matrix, and primary barrier successfully regained without escalation. Influx circulated out through the MPD system.

Tan = Alert to Havtil according to management regulation
Blue = Notification to Havtil according to management regulation
Grey = Alert or Notification to Havtil, depending on potential, in accordance with Management Regulations § 29
Form: Confirmation of alert/notification to Havtil

App C

Matrix for categorization and classification of well control incidents Well intervention operations.

Degree of seriousness	Well intervention
Level 1- Red Critical well control incidents	**1. Blowout**
	2. Failure of primary and secondary barriers
Level 2 – Yellow Serious well control incidents	**1. Failure of primary well barrier. Activation of secondary well barrier element**
Level 3 – Green Regular well control incidents	1. **Temporary reduction of well barrier element function. Activation of redundant well barrier elements. Note 1**
Level 4 – Well control experiences for learning	**1. Incidents with well control potential for industrial learning**

Note 1: Redundant well barrier elements are defined as pipe ram for CT/ cable rams for wireline or similar. See 2.1.2 about incidents that are not required to be reported.

Tan = Alert to Havtil according to management regulation
Blue = Notification to Havtil according to management regulation
Grey = Alert or Notification to Havtil depending in potential in accordance with Management Regulations § 29
Form: Confirmation of alert/notification to Havtil

App D Examples of well control incidents

Drilling and Completion

No.	1. Blowout
D1.1 - 01	Blowout where the installation is evacuated and blowout handled from remote location or another vessel (relief well, capping, etc.)
D1.1 - 02	Underground blowout breaching to seabed.
D1.1 - 03	Blowout breaches seabed but well killed from installation
	2. High HC influx rate
D1.2 - 01	High influx volume (significantly above design criteria on kick margin) and shear ram activated, i.e. in ultimate stage.
D1.2 - 02	Shut in pressure exceeding casing burst pressure or well control equipment working pressure whichever is less.
D1.2 - 03	Loss of surface well control components leading to closing of shear seal ram as only option.
D1.2 - 04	Shear seal ram closed due to internal blowout inside drillpipe (failure to close IBOP/install FOSV)
D1.2 - 05	Riser evacuated to surface, loss of primary well barrier. BOP activated and influx contained by secondary barrier, well killed from installation.
	3. High-rate Shallow gas flow
D1.3 - 01	Fixed installation or jack-up where gas blows to installation.
D1.3 - 02	Floater where gas through sea is coming up to the installation.
D1.3 - 03	Gas in such magnitude that instability of rig is experienced
D1.3 - 04	Jack up where gas breaches out on seabed threatening stability of installation
D1.3 - 05	Long term diverting of gas with high potential for failure of diverting system.
D1.3 - 06	Large OD top hole section riserless with gas flowing and unable to kill.
	4. High-rate shallow water flow
D1.4 - 01	Shallow water flow incident under a jack up or a fixed installation.
	1. Medium HC influx rate
D2.1 - 01	Medium/high influx volume (above design criteria on kick margin) but kick circulated out using conventional kill method. Note: Also valid for medium/high influx volume in sections designed with infinite kick margin.
D2.1 - 02	Underground blowout not breaching to seabed
	2. Total Fluid barrier lost
D2.2 - 01	Sagging of mud resulting in an underbalanced situation - (**influx volume > kick margin**) Handled using conventional kill methods.
D2.2 - 02	Loss situation without being able to maintain the hydrostatic pressure in the well and closure of BOP with pressure underneath.
	3. Medium rate Shallow gas flow
D2.3 - 01	Large OD top hole section riserless with gas flowing and able to kill
D2.3 - 02	Shallow gas diverted on installation.
	1. Low HC or water influx rate
D3.1 - 01	Small HC kick volume (below design criteria on kick margin) handled using conventional kill methods.
D3.1 - 02	Water kick handled using conventional kill methods.
D3.1 - 03	Sagging of mud resulting in an underbalanced situation - (**influx volume < kick margin**) Handled using conventional kill methods.
	2. Low-rate shallow gas
D3.2 - 01	Shallow gas incident with kill operations. No gas handled on installation (riser-less operation).
	3. Low-rate Shallow water flow
D3.3 - 01	Shallow water flow incident with no risk for stability of installation.
D3.3 - 02	Shallow water flow left flowing. Re-spud new location.
	Well control experiences for learning
D4.1 – 01	Circulation of mud with high drilled gas content with closed BOP as precautionary measure, but without applying additional backpressure.
D4.1 – 02	Circulate and increase mud weight due to increasing gas trend without closing BOP.
D4.1 – 03	Shallow gas bubbles from top hole section.
D4.1 – 04	Released gas after cutting or perforation of casing string – not continuous flow of gas.
D4.1 – 05	Released gas after releasing downhole plugs/packers without having an underbalanced situation in well.
D4.1 – 06	Lost mud returning into wellbore (ballooning) .
D4.1 – 07	Release of Nitrogen after a foam cement operation.
D4.1 – 08	Release of gas during pulling of cores
D4.2 – 01	Total losses leading to underbalance, but no influx recorded (lost primary barrier, but no influx)
D4.2 – 02	BOP control lost or functions not available (lost secondary barrier, but no influx).
D4.2 – 03	Temporary P&A with failed shallow plug, but deep plug functional (lost secondary barrier, but no influx).

D4.2 – 04	Unplanned LMRP disconnect without permeable zones present (lost primary barrier if no riser margin, but no influx)
D4.3 – 01	Shallow gas/water incident when drilling riser-less pilot hole from floating drilling unit. Operation according to ALARP principle to de-risk location. Handled according to plan, no escalation.
D4.4 – 01	Failed inflow test. Minor influx due to temporary loss of primary barrier. Fluid barrier regained according to established contingency plans in case of failed inflow test, without escalation of severity.
D4.5 – 01	Influx suppressed by MPD system, within primary barrier envelope. Influx volume within defined limits for circulating out through the MPD system, according to established plans. Influx causes may be high pore pressure, touching pore pressure during dynamic drawdown test, minor equipment issues handled within the contingency functionality of the MPD system.

Well Intervention

NA for Well intervention, see table in app B.

App E Categorization and classification matrix for well integrity incidents

Matrix for categorization and classification of well integrity incidents For wells in operation / production

Severity level	Grade	Guidance
LEVEL 1 – Red: Blowout or other critical well integrity incidents with high risk for personnel, environment, and facility. Alert to HAVTIL according to management regulation §29.	**GRADE 1:** **Leak rate** > 10 kg/s. **Discharge** > 100 kg HC gas immediate release. **Spill**> 500 m3 crude oil.	- Barrier failure with major HC release to external environment. - Crossflow with major release to external environment. - External leak from well resulting in mobilization of emergency preparedness team. - *Critical threat to installation and personnel.*
	GRADE 2: **Leak Rate** 1-10 kg/s. **Discharge** 10-100 kg HC gas immediate release.**Spill** > 50 m3 crude oil.	
LEVEL 2 – Yellow: Serious well integrity incidents. Alert to HAVTIL according to management regulation §29.	**GRADE 1:** **Leak rate** 0,1-1 kg/s. **Discharge** 1-10 kg HC gas immediate release. **Spill** > 1m3 crude oil.	- Barrier failure with HC release to external environment. - Crossflow with release to external environment. - External leak from well resulting in mobilization of emergency preparedness team. - Serious threat to installation and personnel.
LEVEL 3 – Green: Moderate well integrity incidents. Notification to HAVTIL according to management regulation §29.	**GRADE 1:** **Leak rate** 0,01 - 0.1 kg/s. **Discharge** < 1kg HC gas immediate release. **Spill** > 0.01m3 crude oil.	- Barrier failure with limited HC release to external environment. - Uncontrolled crossflow between formations due to well barrier failure(s). - Barrier failures - Flow contained by activating safety barriers outside the well system or Manual Master Valve. - Potential threat to installation and personnel.
	GRADE 2: **Dual well barrier failure** (Primary and Secondary) - without loss of containment to external environment.	
LEVEL 4 – Grey: Minor well integrity incidents. Internal evaluation process according to management regulation §29.	**GRADE 1:** **Leak rate** < 0,01 kg/s. **Spill** <= 0.01m3 crude oil.	- Barrier failure with very limited HC release to external environment. - Negligible threat to installation and personnel. For reference: API RP14B criteria for internal leak = 0,006 kg/s)
	GRADE 2: **Single barrier failure** - no loss of containment.	

Level 1 and 2, Tan background = Alert to HAVTIL according to management regulation §29
Level 3, Blue background = Notification to HAVTIL according to management regulation §29
Level 4, Grey background = Internal evaluation process and possibly Alert or Notification, depending on potential, in accordance with Management Regulations §29

Form: For the notification and reporting of hazard and accident situations follow this link to the relevant form to be filled: HAVTIL notification

7 CHANGES REVISION 6 VS REVISION 7

Section	Change notes
General	Organization name changes for NOROG to Offshore Norge, PSA to HAVTIL and OD to SODIR
1.2 Terminology	Well Intervention operation definition changed to "…conducted using topside mounted pressure control equipment."
1.2 Terminology	Added definitions on Blowout, Categorization, Classification, Discharge, Drilling and Completions operation, Leak and "Production and Operational Phases"
1.2 Terminology	Abbreviations updated and added new • Coiled tubing (CT) • Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) • Surface Back Pressure (SBP) • Well Control Incident (WCI) • Wireline (WL)
2.1.1 Drilling and completion colour codes	Change in definition of Grey incidents from "Non-classified" to "Well control experiences for learning". This to stress the intention of reporting Grey incidents
2.1.2 Well intervention colour codes	• Change in definition of Grey incidents from "Non-classified" to "Well control experiences for learning". This to stress the intention of reporting Grey incidents. • Simplified the grades under different colour codes in line with updated matrix in Appendix B. • Added a table explaining which incidents do not require reporting, ie. Temporary leaks in dynamic seals
4.1.1 Well Integrity Incidents – Colour codes for classification	• Classification updated to also reflect update on Grey incidents with respect to "Well integrity incidents experiences for learning"
4.1.2 Notification and reporting of well integrity incidents	• Added new section describing notification and reporting of well integrity incidents, emphazising the importance of Level 4 and transfer of experience
4.1.3 Principles for Classification of Well Integrity Incidents	• Updated principles for classification of well integrity incidents
Appendix B – Categorization and classification matrix for well control incidents	• Matrix for Drilling and Completion operations extended with three additional "Grey" incident categories, to allow for reduced classification of shallow hazard incidents under certain conditions, and to include learning from failed inflow tests and minor MPD

	influxes handled within primary barrier functionality. • Matrix for Well Intervention operations simplified by removing the "Guidance" column and reducing number of categories.
Appendix C – Examples of well control incidents	• Drilling and Completion table extended with three additions for the new "Grey" incident categories • Well Intervention table removed entirely as part of simplification effort.
Appendix D and F	• Apppendix D and F removed and a reference is rather used to the template to use with respect to "One pager presentations"